UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
Supply School
Marine Corps Combat Service Support Schools
Training Command
PSC 20041
Camp Lejeune, North Carolina 28542-0041

STUDENT OUTLINE

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT PLANNING

GSOC 0601

GROUND SUPPLY OFFICER'S COURSE

M03C061

REVISED 2004/08/18

APPROVED BY_____ **DATE** _____

1. LEARNING OBJECTIVES.

a. TERMINAL LEARNING OBJECTIVES.

(1) Given the deployment of a Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF), mission objectives, and access to an automated system with applicable software, develop a supply support plan to support MAGTF operations, per the references. (3002.05.01)

(2) Given a unit deploying with a Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF), operation order, local Standing Operating Procedures (SOP), access to an automated system with applicable software, and the references, conduct supply support operations within a Combat Service Support Element (CSSE), per the references. (3002.05.03)

b. ENABLING LEARNING OBJECTIVES.

(1) Without the aid of references, select from a list, the three levels of logistics, per the reference(s). (3002.05.03e)

(2) Without the aid of references, select from a list, the two most important CSS principles that impact the commander's decision, per the references. (3002.05.01g)

(3) Without the aid of references, list in writing, the six CSS functional areas, per the reference(s). (3002.05.03c)

(4) Without the aid of references, list in writing, two associated tasks with each of the six CSS functional areas, per the reference(s). (3002.05.03d)

(5) Without the aid of references, select from a list, a permanent CSS organization, per the reference(s). (3002.05.01k)

(6) Without the aid of references, select from a list, a task organized CSS organization, per the reference(s). (3002.05.01l)

(7) Without the aid of references and given a definition, select from a list, the types of tactical CSS organizations, per the reference(s). (3002.05.01m)

(8) Without the aid of references, select from a list, the three standard "sized" Combat Service Support Element's (CSSE's) per the reference(s). (3002.05.01n)

(9) Without the aid of references, select from a list, the puposes of the CSS estimate process, per the reference(s). (3002.05.01p)

(10) With the aid of references and given a list of supply-related CSS mission objectives, as a member of a group, select the objectives that coincide with the MAGTF mission objectives, per the reference(s). (3002.05.01h)

(11) With the aid of references and given a scenario, as a member of a group, describe orally the Commander's intent and concept of operations, per the reference(s). (3002.05.01a)

(12) Without the aid of references, select from a list, the primary CSS planning document Annex within the Operations Order that supports a given operation, per the reference(s). (3002.05.01b)

(13) With the aid of references and given a scenario, as a member of a group, explain orally, the Concept of Logistics Support and the Concept of CSS paragraphs within the Annex D of the Operations Order, per the reference(s). (3002.05.01f)

(14) Without the aid of references, select from a list, the CSSE Commander's primary planning document that provides specific guidance and direction to subordinate CSS units regarding their tasks and missions, per the reference(s). (3002.05.01d)

(15) Without the aid of references, select from a list, the definitions for the types of CSS missions, per the reference(s). (3002.05.03k)

(16) Without the aid of references, select from a list, the three essential elements of a CSS mission statement, per the reference(s). (3002.05.03l)

(17) Without the aid of references, describe in writing, the three primary functions of the Landing Force Support Party's (LFSP) role, per the reference(s). (3002.05.01o)

(18) Without the aid of references and given a list of descriptions, match each description with the applicable CSS installation, per the reference(s). (3002.05.01j)

(19) Without the aid of references, select from a list, the two CSS organizations that are organic to the Marine Air Wing (MAW), per the reference(s). (3002.05.01q)

(20) Without the aid of references, select from a list, the main CSSE controlling agency that coordinates CSS for the operating units, per the reference(s). (3002.05.01i)

(21) Without the aid of references, select from a list, the two arrangements for the CSSOC, per the reference(s). (3002.05.01r)

(22) Without the aid of references, select from a list, the primary form to request support used by the CSSE, per the reference(s). (3002.05.01s)

(23) With the aid of references and given a scenario, as a member of a group, fill out a Rapid Request form, per the reference(s). (3002.05.03j)

(24) Without the aid of references and given a scenario, fill out a Rapid Request form, per the reference(s). (3002.05.03u)

(25) Without the aid of references, select from a list, the mission of the Tactical Logistics Group (TACLOG), per the reference(s). (3002.05.01t)

(26) Without the aid of references, as a member of a group, plan and provide supply-related CSS requirements to support the mission of the MAGTF, per the reference(s). (3002.05.01e)

(27) With the aid of references, as a member of a group, describe orally, the supply-related CSS requirements to support the mission of the MAGTF, per the reference(s). (3002.05.01c)

(28) Without the aid of references, select from a list, the main purpose of the War Reserve Stocks, per the reference(s). (3002.05.01v)

(29) Without the aid of references and given a list of descriptions, match the major subcomponent of the Marine Corps War Reserve Program with the applicable description, per the reference(s). (3002.05.01u)

(30) Without the aid of references, select the definition for equipment and supplies as Remain Behind Equipment (RBE), per the reference(s). (3002.05.01w)

(31) Without the aid of references, select the definition for equipment and supplies as Left Behind Equipment (LBE), per the reference(s). (3002.05.01x)

BODY

1. MARINE CORPS WARFIGHTING / REFERENCE PUBLICATIONS & LEVELS OF LOGISTICS.

a. The Marine Corps has shifted from FMFM designations for its publication system to the current use of Marine Corps Warfighting Publications (MCWP) and Marine Corps Reference Publications (MCRP). As depicted on the USMC web site, each of the associated logistics publications are in varying degrees of completion, per the legend provided. Until the draft version for these pending publications become official, the present (dated) directives will continue to provide guidance.

(1) MCWP & MCRP are available on CD: **PCN** 14300009100.

(2) MCWP & MCRP are available on the USMC web site: http://www.usmc.mil > choose "Publications", the "Doctrinal Publications" or visit: http://www.doctrine.quantico.usmc.mil.

(3) See your publications NCO for hard copy versions of these publications.

b. Logistics Defined: "The science of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of forces." **JP 1-02 & MCWP 4-1**

United States Code, Title 10, assigns each service responsibility for organizing, training, and equipping forces for employment in the national interest.

Joint Pub 4-0 states that each service is responsible for the logistics support of its own forces, and clarifies logistics support responsibilities for forces assigned to combatant commanders.

Based on this guidance, the Marine Corps, in coordination and cooperation with the Navy, has made logistical self-sufficiency an essential element of Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) expeditionary warfighting capabilities.

c. **Levels of War**. **Refer to MCWP 4-11 page 1-2 and MCWP 4-12 chapter 2 and discuss the levels of war.**

(1) Strategic Level: "Establish national and multinational military objectives; sequence initiatives; define limits and assess risks for the use of military and other instruments of national power; develop global plans or theater war plans to achieve these objectives; and provide military forces and other capabilities in accordance with strategic plans." **(JP 1-02)**

(2) Operational Level: "Campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted, and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theaters or areas of operations, bridging the gap between the strategic and tactical levels of war." **(JP 1-02)**

(3) Tactical Level: "Where battles and engagements are planned and executed." **(JP 1-02)**

d. Levels of Logistics. For each level of war: Strategic, Operational and Tactical there is a corresponding level of logistics: **Refer to MCWP 4-11 page 1-2 and MCWP 4-12 chapter 1 for the levels of logistics.**

(1) Strategic Logistics: "Supports organizing, training and equipping the forces that are needed to further the national interest. It links the national economic base (people, resources and industry) to military operations. These capabilities include the Department of Defense (DOD), the Military Services, other Government agencies as necessary or appropriate and the support of the private sector."

(2) Operational Logistics: "Links tactical requirements to strategic capabilities; supports requirements to sustain campaigns and major operations, provides theater-wide logistics support and coordinates the allocation, apportionment and distribution of resources within theater, to include force closure, sustainment, reconstitution and redeployment of Marine forces in theater. "The component commander may assign operational-level logistic tasks to the combat service support element and aviation combat element commanders in addition to their tactical logistic responsibilities."

(3) Tactical Logistics: "Includes organic unit capabilities and the Combat Service Support (CSS) activities necessary to support military operations. Its focus is to support the Commander's intent and concept of operations while maximizing the commander's flexibility and freedom of action. It involves the coordination of functions required to sustain and move units, personnel, equipment and supplies."

2. PRINCIPLES OF CSS.

a. General. Like the principles of war, the principles of CSS are only guides for planning, organization, management and execution. These principles should be considered as the foundation upon which the leader applies experience and imagination to achieve success. These principles are not rigid rules, which are applicable in every situation, because every situation is different. **Refer to MCWP 4-11 pages 4-4 through 4-7 also MCWP 4-11.7/4-6 page 1-2 for principles of CSS.**

b. Priorities. Identifying the principles that will have priority in a given situation is essential toward providing effective CSS. Establishing the priorities of CSS is similar to establishing priorities of fire or maneuver. You must know what the focus of effort is and who is the main effort. The Commander's Mission Statement and the Commander's Intent are integral for this focus. **Refer to MCWP 4-1 page 1-5 and 1-6 and discuss priorities**.

c. **Principles**. The seven principles of CSS apply to each Level of Logistics and are as follows: **Refer to FM 101-5 for the Principles of War.**

(1) Responsiveness. Provides the MAGTF with the right support at the right time and in the right place during the employment of forces. This may be the most critical principle of the seven. The response time of tactical logistics is necessarily rapid and requires anticipatory planning to provide responsive support.

(2) Simplicity. This is the avoidance of complexity. Simplicity promotes efficiency in both the planning and execution of CSS operations. This is achieved through the use of mission type orders and reliance on well-understood standardized procedures.

(3) Flexibility. Is the ability to adapt to changing situations, missions and concepts of operation.

(4) Economy. Provides support with the least amount of resources necessary to accomplish the mission. Austerity, or the avoidance of excess, is a component of economy.

(5) Attainability. Is the ability to provide the essential supplies and services required to begin combat operations.

(6) Sustainability. Is the ability to maintain support throughout the period during which the support is required.

(7) Survivability. Is the capacity of the organization to prevail in the face of potential destruction.

d. The two most important principles, which impact and have the greatest influence on the Commander's decision, are Responsiveness and Flexibility.

3. FUNCTIONAL AREAS OF CSS.

a. General. The objective of CSS is to sustain all elements of the MAGTF in an area of operation. This means that CSS must provide continuous support throughout the entire length of the operation to enhance the MAGTF's ability to fight and be successful in its mission. **Refer to MCWP 4-1 page 1-5 and MCWP 4-11 pages 1-3 through 1-7, and MCWP 4-12 appendix A for the division of labor by functional area for supply support.**

b. Functional Areas. CSS is logistics for the tactical level of war. Supply and Maintenance Activities generate materiel readiness; transportation resources move personnel, equipment and supplies within the tactical area of operations; and general engineering support, health service support and general services support contribute to mission accomplishment. All functions must be integrated into the overall logistics support operation to ensure total support of MAGTF operations. These areas are grouped into the following six functional areas: **Refer to MCWP 4-1 pages 1-5 to 1-10, MCWP 4-11 pages 4-7 to 4-11, A-1 to A-3, MCWP 4-11.7 pages 4-6 and MCWP 4-12 chapter 1 for additional information on the functional areas of CSS.**

(1) Services. All other CSS which provides for the disbursing, postal, MP, security support, exchange support morale, civil affairs, graves registration, welfare, recreation and legal requirements of the command. **Refer to MCRP 4-11.8 for detailed information on services in an Expeditionary Environment and MCWP 4-11 page 5-31 to 5-38 for service support.**

(2) Supply. The determination of requirements, procurement, distribution, storage, care in storage, disposal, and salvage of material. **Refer to MCWP 4-11.7/4-6 pages 1-4 for supply support.**

(3) Maintenance. This is action taken to retain material in a serviceable condition and/or to restore it to serviceability. This includes inspection, servicing, adjusting, tuning, testing & calibration, repair, modifications, rebuilding & overhaul, reclamation and recovery and evacuation. For ground maintenance, the Marine Corps defines three levels of maintenance that then correspond to five Echelons of Maintenance. However, aviation maintenance is consolidated within the three levels of supply: Organizational (Using Unit), Intermediate and Depot. The Integrated Logistics Capability concept (ILC) is attempting to transition the ground maintenance echelons into the three levels of maintenance, in an attempt to avoid redundancy, economic use of resources and expedite the return of equipment to the warfighter. **Refer to MCWP 4-11 pages 5-12 to 5-15 for detailed maintenance information.**

(4) Health Services. Care to the sick, injured, wounded and prompt, orderly evacuation of casualties. Technical measures that safeguard the health of the command. Medical services are provided within five echelons of care. Echelon I is basic life saving and immediate evacuation at the unit level. Various levels of care, echelons, are provided further back in the theater (echelon II - IV), dependent on the concept of operations. Normally the Medical Bn and its detachment provide this level of care. Echelon V is normally stateside hospitals. **Refer to MCWP 4-11 pages 5-29 and 5-30 for detailed Health Services Information.**

(5) General Engineering. Provides personnel and equipment for construction, facilities maintenance, demolition or obstacle removal and Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) support. This slide depicts the numerous tasks the engineer support Marines provide to operational forces.

These tasks include: vertical and horizontal construction, bridge construction, water production/distribution (TSB assistance) and bulk fuel distribution. **Refer to MCWP 4-11 pages 5-27 and 5-28 for detailed information on engineering support.**

(6) Transportation. This physical movement of resources, personnel and material: by water, air, and surface means to meet requirements. In detail, this includes embarkation, landing support, MT, port & terminal operations, air delivery and material handling equipment and freight or passenger transportation. Transportation Support Battalion (TSB) is charged with providing landing, terminal service, material handling and air delivery support for the landing force. These functions are consolidated within the listed companies. **Refer to MCWP 4-11.7/4-6 pages 5-3 to 5-5 for a description of Supply Battalion and MCRP 5-2A/5-12A for operational** terms and graphics.

c. Supply Relationship. The overall effectiveness of CSS is dependent on a sound supply system. Supply support has the greatest potential impact on the MAGTF commander's ability to integrate essential elements of firepower, mobility and sustainability. Failure in other CSS functional areas occur more often due to failure of the related supply system than any other single cause. **Refer to MCWP 4-11, pages 2-5 to 2-10 for company level details fro each Battalion within an FSSG)**

4. CSS ORGANIZATIONS.

a. General. The CSS organizations may be either permanently structured or task organized. They may perform a specific functional task to provide capabilities across a spectrum of functions.

b. **Types**. The two types of tactical CSS are,

(1) Organic**.** Subordinate element commanders are responsible for the efficient employment of organic logistic capabilities. All elements of the MAGTF execute tactical logistics to some degree by employing organic capabilities. The initial source of logistic support available to any unit is its own organic capabilities. Organic capabilities are defined in T/O's and
T/E's. **Refer to MCWP 4-11 pages 1-3, 2-11 and 2-13 for a Marine Division, Regiment and Battalion's organic CSS/Logistics capabilities.**

(2) Sustainment. The CSSE, possessing capabilities beyond those found in the other MAGTF elements, conducts CSS operations to provide any additional logistic support the other MAGTF elements require. The Combat Service Support Element (CSSE) Commander is also responsible for executing CSS operations in support of the entire MAGTF. Sustained support is provided by the FSSG to all units of the MEF.

(3) In other words, many units have their own CSS type functions built directly into their units structure. For example, the H&S (Headquarters & Service) Co has the structure (personnel: T/O and the equipment: T/E) to perform "organic" CSS functions in support of the entire battalion (the line Companies, Weapons Company and the H&S Company itself).

(4) Hence the "Service" in H&S Co. However, this organic CSS, the listed commodity areas within the H&S Company are limited in nature. The primary objective, or "Core Competency" of a Marine Infantry Battalion is to close with and destroy the enemy. This Battalion can't afford to be tied down with a CSS organization that has a "large footprint" (e.g. big target, difficult to move around the battlefield).

(5) Taking this a step further, the HQ Co, Inf Regt has its own "organic" MT section with HMMWV's and an ambulance.

a. The Division's HQ Bn has its own "Organic" MT Co that employs up to (148) 5-Tons in support of the Division's.

(6) However, either at the Battalion, Regiment, or at the Division level, this "Organic" CSS is limited in nature.

(7) At this point the "sustained" CSS steps up. This "sustained" support, is CSS Support that is beyond the limited capacity of the Infantry Battalion, Regiment or Division. At the FSSG level, this "sustained" Support is the FSSG's function as the supporter of the War Fighters. This "sustained" CSS support is the FSSG "core competency."

(8) For example, the FSSG provides "sustained" support to the Division and therefore the Infantry Battalion. In a MEU, the MSSG provides the "sustained" CSS support, while in a Special Purpose MAGTF (SPMAGTF), a specifically tailored CSSD would be formed to provide tailored "sustained" CSS support.

5. SIZED CSSE'S.

a. The CSSE is the MAGTF element that is task organized to provide a full range of Combat Service Support to the MAGTF. The CSSE Commander (i.e., S-3) and MAGTF Staff (i.e., S-4) work together to make recommendations to the MAGTF Commander on the control of Supply Support, distribution methods and replenishment system of supply. The following are the three types of CSSE's: **Refer to MCWP 4-11 page 2-3, 2-4 and 2-17, MCWP 4-1 pages 2-13 and 2-14, MCWP 4-11.7/ 4-6 pages 1-1 and 5-1 to 5-2 and MCWP 4-12 chapter 2 and discuss CSSE's**

(1) Force Service Support Group (FSSG). The FSSG is a permanently structured CSSE organization whose mission is to provide CSS to the MEF. Normally, the FSSG is the primary source of non-aviation-peculiar CSS to a MEF. As the CSSE of a MEF (or MEF Headquarters Group: MHG), it supports one Marine Division, and a Marine Air Wing (MAW). It provides, either general or direct support, sustained CSS above the organic capabilities of supported elements of the MEF including geographically supported MAGTF's. The FSSG maintains and deploys with 60 Days of Supply (DOS).

(2) Brigade Service Support Group (BSSG). The BSSG is the task-organized CSSE, providing a full spectrum of expeditionary CSS to the MEB. In one or more MEF's, the BSSG is

also referred to as FSSG (FWD), an older designation associated to the past MEF (FWD) concept. It draws its personnel and equipment from the permanent battalions of the FSSG. These detachments from the FSSG are usually at the company level (e.g. Supply Company, Maintenance Company). The BSSG deploys with 30 DOS for various Classes of Supply. Dependent on the mission, the BSSG can become the forward echelon of the FSSG, or act as the logistics service component for the Marine Corps. The BSSG has the same numeric designation as that of the MEB, it supports (e.g. I MEF's 1st MEB will have BSSG-1, II MEF will have BSSG-2 and BSSG-4 (AT)).

(3) MEU Service Support Group (MSSG). The MSSG is the task-organized CSSE of the MEU. It draws its personnel and equipment from the permanent battalions of the FSSG. The MSSG has the same numeric designation, as that of the MEU is supports. The MSSG could be tasked as the lead CSS component for a BSSG.

(4) Combat Service Support Detachment (CSSD). A CSSD may be task organized from a FSSG or other MAGTF CSSE. It is tailored to provide rearming, refueling, and repair capabilities to the MAGTF / SPMAGTF / Air Contingency MAGTF (ACM), or designated subordinate elements. In other words, a CSSD is formed in a similar matter as an MSSG is from the FSSG, however, the key difference concerning this formation is that a CSSD may or may not draw corresponding detachments form each of the functional battalions of the FSSG. For example, a Battalion Landing Team (BLT) conducting independent operations or an aircraft squadron operating at a remote airfield. **Refer to MCWP 4-12 chapter 2 for deployment and employment criteria for CSSE's.**

b. The right-sized force for the right-sized mission will come with the right-sized CSSE.

(1) The MEF fights within the "single battle" concept at the Operational Level. Equivalent to an Army Corps by virtue of its combined combat power, the MEF brings a substantial amount of capabilities to the fight. This slide depicts the major weapon and support systems within a typical MEF.

(2) The MEB bridges the gap between the MEF and a MEU. Not as robust as a MEF, it still retains a respectable level of combat power to conduct combat operations of limited scope. The MEB is equivalent to an Army Division by virtue of its combined combat power. This slide depicts the major weapon and support systems within a typical MEB. Additionally, a MEB can be configured around a Regimental Landing Team (RLT), or slated as an MPF MEB, which is slightly larger in both weapons systems and manpower.

(3) The smallest of our standard MAGTF's, the MEU normally deploys on three amphibious ships on a rotational basis. Though it does not have the "kick in the door" capabilities that the MEB does, it represents a forward deployed force that is Special Operations Capable (SOC), and can act as a deterrence asset. The MEU is equivalent to an Army Brigade by virtue of its combined combat power, specifically a Battalion Landing Team (BLT) and a composite squadron. One notable difference for the ACE is that it deploys with enough CSS to support 90 days of combat flying hours, but the same 15 DOS of class V (A). **Refer to MCWP 4-11 page 2-18 for numerical designators.**

6. CSS PLANNING DOCUMENTS.

a. General. CSS planning documents provides instruction and information for internal use within the MAGTF. We will take a look at the four major planning documents for CSS operations. The following table provides additional information: **Refer to MCWP 4-11 pages 4-12 to 4-14 and MCWP 4-12, chapter 4 and discuss CSS planning documents.**

Document	Prepared By
Logistic/Combat Service Support Estimate	GE, GCE, ACE, CSSE down to battalion and squadron level
Annex D (Logistics/Combat Service Support) to OPORD	GE, GCE, ACE, CSSE down to battalion and squadron level
CSSE Operation Order	CSSE

b. CSS Estimate.

(1) The purpose of the CSS Estimate process is to: **Refer to MCWP 4-11 appendix B.**

(a) Determine if Combat Service Support (CSS) capabilities are sufficient to support proposed courses of action (COA's).

(b) Determine which COA is most desirable from a logistics and/or CSS standpoint.

(c) Determine what measures must be taken by the Commander to overcome logistic and/or CSS problems and/or limiting factors in supporting each COA

(2) After reception of an initiating order and during the Command and Staff planning process, the G-3 / S-3 will be tasked by the commander to develop Courses of Action (COA). COA's are basically brief descriptions of Schemes of Maneuver. They are developed to provide the staff and the commander with tactical options for executing the mission providing the What, Where, When, Why and How.

(3) The G-3 / S-3 briefs the COA's to the staff and the staff then develops Estimates of Supportability. This is an analysis resulting from an orderly examination of the logistic factors influencing the COA's. The CSS estimate measures how well the COA's can be supported by CSS. This is done by analyzing each COA based upon the CSS functional areas.

(a) Consideration of relevant facts:
* Current disposition
* Supported units requirements
* Commander's guidance and intent

(b) Analyze each COA by functional area
* Capabilities and Requirements by CCS functional areas

* Pro and Con's of each COA

(4) Conclusions are made concerning the degree and manner of the logistics influence on each COA and a preferred COA from the CSS viewpoint is selected. All other staff sections analyze each COA from their particular occupation's viewpoint. Each staff officer then determines their preferred COA based upon their conclusions from their analysis.

(5) The commander then uses these recommendations and conclusions to make the final decision on a specific COA to use.

a. <u>COA #1</u>

1 Helo Co (SE): Lt Inf Co w/ Weap Section as the SE will be inserted into vicinity of LF OBJ 1 to establish a blocking position to the north of ATF OBJ A.

2 Boat Co (SE): Lt Inf in boats, Weap Section as the SE will be inserted into vicinity of LF OBJ 2 to establish a blocking position to the south of ATF OBJ A.

3 Main Effort (ME): TF Lasalle (C Co, AAV Plt, Tank Plt, Arty Btry, Weapons Co (-), & LAV Plt screen) as the ME will conduct an amphibious assault on the landing beach to the southwest in a north-easterly direction to destroy the enemy in the vicinity of ATF OBJ A.

4 MSSG GS to MEU providing GS support to the SE's with a MCSSD in DS to the ME.

b. <u>COA #2</u>

1 Boat Co (SE): Lt Inf in boats, Weap Section as the SE will be inserted into vicinity of LF OBJ 1 to establish a blocking position to the north of ATF OBJ A.

2 Helo Co (SE): Lt Inf Co w/ Weap Section as the SE will be inserted into vicinity of LF OBJ 2 to establish a blocking position to the south of ATF OBJ A.

3 Main Effort (ME): TF Lasalle (C Co, AAV Plt, Tank Plt, Arty Btry, Weapons Co (-), & LAV Plt screen) as the ME will conduct an amphibious assault on the landing beach to the southwest in a north easterly direction to destroy the enemy in the vicinity of ATF OBJ A.

4 MSSG GS to MEU providing GS support to the SE's with a MCSSD in DS to the ME.

c. <u>COA #3</u>

1 Helo Co (SE): Lt Inf Co w/ Weap Section & Arty Btry as the SE will be inserted into vicinity of LF OBJ 2 to establish a blocking position to the south of ATF OBJ A.

2 Main Effort (ME): TF Lasalle (C Co, AAV Plt, Tank Plt, Weapons Co (-), & LAVs screen) as the ME will conduct an amphibious assault on the landing beach to the northwest in a south-easterly direction to destroy the enemy in the vicinity of ATF OBJ A.

3 MSSG GS to MEU providing GS support to the SE with a MCSSD in DS to the ME.

c. Annexes.

1. **ANNEX A: FORCE COMPOSITION; SEE ANNEX A FOLLOWING PAGE 10 OF THE OP ORDER.**

2. **BATTLEFIELD" (IPB); PROVIDES ENEMY, TERRAIN, MAPS DISTRIBUTION PLAN, ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION (EEI'S) CONCERNING THE ENEMY AND HLZ SITES.**

3. **ANNEX C: OPERATIONS; MISSION, CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS, EXECUTION, TASKS, RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (ROE), CHECK POINTS, FIRE SUPPORT, AVIATION SUPPORT, TARGET LISTS and COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS.**

4. **ANNEX D: LOGISTICS; SEE BELOW.**

5. **ANNEX E: PERSONNEL; PERSTAT REPORTS, REPLACEMENTS, LNO'S.**

6. **ANNEX J: COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS.**

7. **ANNEX K: COMMUNICATIONS PLAN; CSS NET, LOGISTICS SUPPORT (MAINTENANCE, BATTERY AND WIRE REQUIREMENTS), PLAD'S FOR NAVAL MESSAGES.**

8. **ANNEX N: AIR OPERATIONS; HLZ'S, PROCEDURES FOR REQUESTS FOR ASSAULT SUPPORT, HELICOPTER EMPLOYMENT and ASSAULT LANDING TABLES (HEALT) BY WAVES, SEARCH AND RESCUE (SAR) PROCEDURES.**

9. **ANNEX R: AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS; EMBARKATION PLAN, LANDING PLAN, SERIAL ASSIGNMENT TABLE AND REHEARSAL PLAN.**

10 **ANNEX S: GROUND SAFETY; PROCEDURES, VEHICULAR, SUPPLIES (SMOKE and CHEM LIGHTS).**

c. Annex D. This annex specifies those requirements, priorities, and allocations necessary for the integration of the CSS effort in support of the MAGTF. This integration ensures the logistics community is in step with the maneuver elements Concept of Operations (Annex C).

(1) Provides the Concept of Logistics and the concept of CSS Support.

(2) It normally specifies support by period or phase. It includes deployment, employment and redeployment planning information.

(3) Internal and external support coordination requirements.

(4) Disseminates financial guidance for the MAGTF.

(5) Provides appendices for each CSS functional area.

(6) This annex promulgates the commander's overall plan and guidance for the provision of CSS and logistic support to the MAGTF during each phase of the operation.

d. Concept of Logistics and CSS. For CSS units, the Concept of Logistics/CSS equates to a CSS concept of operations. It describes a broad concept of how the MAGTF will conduct CSS operations. It is developed based on the COA selected by the commander.

(1) As you can see from this Operations Order (Op Order), the format used follows the standard: Situation, Mission, Execution, Admin/Logistics and Command & Signal (SMEAC) paragraphs that you are familiar with from TBS.

(2) Per page 9 of this Op Order, the Concept of Logistics appears in paragraph 4.b.

(3) For additional clarity: Per page D-1 of the Annex D to the Op Order, the Concept of Logistics appears on page D-1 within paragraph 3.a. and the Concept of Combat Service Support appears on page D-2 within paragraph 3.b.

(4) MCWP 4-11 Appendix C (C-2) identifies the Concept of Logistics and the Concept of Combat Service Support under one paragraph 3.a. This difference exists because the example Annex D within MCWP 4-11 for a CSS operations order: both concepts and logistics and CSS are one in the same for a CSS unit. However, the Valiant Usher Annex D is based on the 37th MEU's Op Order (the command element, a non-CSS organization). Therefore, the Concept of Logistics and the Concept of Combat Service Support are expressed in different paragraphs.

(a) The Concept of Logistics would be best expressed as the over-arching logistics plan for the entire MEU. Where as, the Concept of Combat Service Support is CSS specific. This paragraph and its sub-paragraphs assist the CSS Commander in the development of his CSS Operations Order and its supporting Annex D.

(5) The bottom line for each of these paragraphs, and subsequent planning documents is the "synchronization" of logistic / CSS operations to support the warfighter across the battlefield, form homeport to the foxhole. This logistic / CSS plan must merry up with the warfighter's scheme of maneuver to provide responsive support by each of the functional areas of CSS.

Refer to FM 100-15 chapter 2 and discuss Corps Operations.

e. **CSSE Operation Order**. This order, in SMEAC format, states the mission of the CSSE and establishes task organizations. The CSSE Operation Order's primary purpose is to provide specific guidance and direction to subordinate CSS units regarding their tasks and missions. It provides amplifying information on the CSSE commander's requirements, priorities, and allocations for the provision of CSS. **Refer to page C-1 of the FMFM 4-1, CSSE Operation Order.**

(1) It describes "how" the CSSE will support the MAGTF.

(2) It delineates the type of support missions that each detachment of the CSSE will provide (e.g. DS / GS).

(3) The CSSE Op Order should be synchronized to the MAGTF Command Element's Annex C and Annex D. **Refer to FMFM 4-1 appendix C also MCWP 4-11 page 4-14 for additional planning documents.**

7. CSS MISSIONS.

a. General. There are two standard CSS missions. The reason there are different missions is dependent upon who needs support and the Concept of Operations.

b. Standard Missions. The two standard CSS missions are: **Refer to MCWP 4-11 pages 3-4 and 3-5 for standard missions.**

(1) Direct Support (DS). "A mission requiring a force to support another specific force and authorizing it to answer directly the supported force's request for assistance." (JP 1-02) A CSS unit assigned a direct-support mission is immediately responsive to the needs of the supported unit. It furnishes continuous support to that unit and coordinates its operations to complement the concept of operations of the supported unit. The DS mission creates a one to one relationship between the supporting and supported unit.

(2) General Support (GS). A CSS unit assigned a general support mission supports the MAGTF or several units within the MAGTF under the direction of the CSSE commander. The MAGTF CSSE always has a general-support mission. However, CSSE Commanders may assign different missions to subordinate units consistent with the requirements of the tactical situation. The GS mission is the most centralized mission. The CSSE Commander retains full control over subordinate units, to include establishing the priority of their efforts.

(3) Mutual Support. The action that units render each other because of their assigned tasks, their position relative to each other and their inherent capabilities. **Refer to MCWP 4-12, chapter 2 page 9 and discuss mutual support**.

c. CSS Mission Statements. The CSS mission statement can be found in the CSSE Operation Order. The following information describes the mission statements contents and how the contents are combined and organized to create an effective mission statement.

(1) Every mission statement has four essential elements. The first three of these elements are mandatory. The fourth element is optional and is used to provide additional information and guidance. The four essential elements are:

(a) Identification of the supporting unit.

(b) Designation of the standard mission assigned.

(c) Identification of the supported unit.

(d) Additional information.

(2) Example.

(a) Supporting unit: CSSD-67

(b) Mission assigned: Support to the whole force (GS)

(c) Supported unit: 2nd Marines, 2nd Marine Division

(d) Additional information: On order, provide priority of support (DS) to 2nd Battalion, 2nd Marines, 2nd Marine Division.

"Combat Service Support Detachment-67 provides General Support **(GS)** to 2nd Marines, 2nd Marine Division. On order, CSSD-67 provides Direct Support **(DS)** to 2nd Battalion, 2nd Marines."

1 This mission statement describes the Who, What, Where, When

2 For Why, see the Commander's Intent.

3 For How, see the Concept of Logistics / CSS support. The How for the MAGTF's Op Order can be found in their Concept of Operations. Your Concept of Logistics / CSS support mirrors the Concept of Operations.

d. Nonstandard Missions. The CSSE commander normally uses the direct support and/or general support standard missions to meet the needs of the supported force. However, unique situations may dictate the selection of a nonstandard mission. The nonstandard mission must satisfy the requirements of the specific situation and requires detailed planning and coordination. **Refer to MCWP 4-11 pages 3-5 and 3-6.**

(1) The optional fourth element of the mission statement is the operative element in the Nonstandard Mission. The optional element amplifies the basic mission statement and addresses unique responsibilities and relationships.

(2) The mission statement for a nonstandard mission must contain the three mandatory elements. For example:

a. CSSD-28 provides general support for assigned U.S. and multinational forces.

(3) The optional fourth element, which gives advance information on subsequent missions, may also be used, as appropriate. The mission statement above is adequate for a standard mission. For the CSSD-28 Commander, however, it does not provide enough information in this particular case. With standard missions, the CSSD Commander immediately knows the associated responsibilities. When assigning a nonstandard mission, the CSSE Commander must also give detailed coordinating instructions to amplify the mission statement. The CSSE OP ORD should include this additional information.

8. CSS INSTALLATIONS AND ACTIVITIES.

a. General. The source for most combat service support is the CSS installations. These installations are located either aboard ship or ashore. The MAGTF concept of operation must address the requirement to defend these installations. The tactical situation dictates their number, location, size and capabilities. **Refer to MCWP 4-11 pages 1-7 to 1-9 and the diagram on page 5-14 for an example of CSS Installations.**

b. Landing Force Support Party (LFSP). The LFSP is a temporary task organized unit peculiar to amphibious operations. It supports the landing and movement of troops, equipment, and supplies across beaches or into Helicopter Landing Zones (HLZ's). Additionally, it manages the beach and helicopter landing zones. It establishes initial communications for the MSSG and the MEU. It provides CSS to the landing forces until the CSSE is ashore and capable of assuming responsibility for the CSS. Closely associated to the LFSP, is the Navy's Beach Party or Beach Masters that are tasked with actually landing and launching of LCU's & LCAC's at the beach.
Refer to MCWP 4-11 pages 2-21 and 5-2 through 5-3 also MCWP 4-11.7 and 4-6 page 5-2 and MCWP 4-11.3 pages 5-6 through 5-8 for Landing Force Support Party.

c. Beach Support Area (BSA). Is normally one of the first CSS installations established ashore by the LFSP. Located to the rear of the landing force and may be expanded to provide all of the six functional areas of CSS. The beach support area permits initial accumulation of sustainment ashore and subsequent establishment of a CSS area that provides sustained support to the landing force. It includes facilities for the evacuation of wounded, enemy prisoners of war and captured materiel.

d. Combat Service Support Area (CSSA). The CSSA is commonly developed from the BSA. The CSSA is a forward support installation normally operated by CSSD's. It provides minimum essential support to the MAGTF in any one, all, or combination of the functional areas of CSS. This installation is designed to provide continues support to the landing force throughout the operation. The CSSA is a primary target and the landing forces must plan for their defense against all threats.

e. Force Combat Service Support Area (FCSSA). Primary CSS installation established to support MAGTF operations ashore. The CSSE's full CSS capabilities can be provided from this area. Usually established by the FSSG during a general off-load near a beach, seaport, and/or airfield. From this location, the CSSE supports other CSS installations and provides support not available at forward installation. The FCSSA normally contains the CSSE command post.

f. Landing Zone Support Area (LZSA). An LZSA is commonly developed from the BSA. This is a forward support CSS installation established to support helicopter-borne assault forces. Although it can expand to a CSSA, it is most often a short- term installation with limited capabilities. It normally contains dumps for rations, fuel, ammunition and water only. Maintenance is limited to contact teams.

g. Repair and Replenishment Point (RRP). Established to support a mechanized or other rapidly moving force, normally in the forward areas near the supported units. It may be a prearranged point or a hastily select point to rearm, refuel, or provide repair services to the supported force. Multiple points may be established depending upon the size of the supported unit and the area supported. These points; can also be used by the CSS units as supply delivery points.

h. Forward Arming and Refueling Point (FARP). This a temporary facility deployed by an aviation commander. This installation is normally located in the main battle area close to the area of operation (assembly areas), while towns and villages are ideally suited with their inherent hard services, road networks and their facilitation of night operation. It provides rapid fueling and arming necessary for the employment of aviation maneuver units. Establishing a FARP is situation dependent, requires security, concealment and the masking of radar.

i. Airfields. This includes Expeditionary Airfields (EAF) and Bare Base Expeditionary Airfields.

(1) An EAF is a prefabricated and fully portable airfield normally constructed by engineers within the MWSS and my require augmentation from engineers within the CSSE and/or the Navy Mobile Construction Battalion(s). It provides the capability to launch and recover aircraft under all-weather conditions.

(2) The Bare Base EAF's take advantage of an existing airfield or road network to establish an EAF. The Bare Base EAF also minimizes the embarkation and construction requirements normally associated with the full EAF.

j. Aviation-Peculiar. **Refer to MCWP 4-11 pages 2-13 to 2-15 and MCWP 4-11.7/ 4-6 chapter 8 for Aviation Peculiar.**

(1) The Marine Air Wings (MAW's) in support of each MEF contain robust CSS structures within their organizations. This robust CSS structure is focused towards aviation support, but the MAW's also contain ground support agencies required to conduct their specific missions.

(2) Air-Capable Ships. The Intermediate Level Support for a MEU Air Combat Element (ACE) will be provided by the air-capable ship upon which the ACE is embarked. The department aboard this ship which will provide the support is known as the Aircraft Intermediate Maintenance Department (AIMD). The MALS, described below, augment the ship's capabilities with personnel and materials.

(3) Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron (MALS). Permanently organized and provides a core intermediate level aviation-peculiar CSS capability for a Marine Aircraft Group (MAG) or ACE. The MALS provides the supply and maintenance heavy support to the MAW, and some additional support below:

(a) Conducts intermediate maintenance on aircraft and aeronautical equipment.

(b) Provides aircraft supply support.

(c) Assembles and distributes class V (A) ammunition (requires motor transport support from the MWSS for distribution).

(d) Manufactures cryogenics (Oxygen, Ejection).
Provides supply support to the MWSS expeditionary airfield and weather sections.

(4) Marine Wing Support Group (MWSG). Is a permanently organized organization whose mission is to provide aviation-peculiar CSS to the MAW. Normally it assigns its Marine Wing Support Squadrons (MWSS) to support a MAG. The MWSG provides the remaining CSS functional area support (e.g. fuel, engineering, expeditionary airfields) to the MAW. An MWSS provides the following essential aviation ground support to an ACE:

(a) Internal airfield communications.

(b) Weather service.

(c) Expeditionary airfield service.

(d) Aircraft rescue and firefighting.

(e) Aviation and ground refueling.

(f) Essential engineering service.

(g) Motor transport support.

(i) Field messing support.

(j) Medical Service.

(k) Personnel training.

(l) NBC Defense.

(m) Security and Law Enforcement.

(n) Air Base Commandant functions.

(o) EOD support.

(5) Marine Air Control Group (MACG). Is a permanently organized organization within the MAW that provides Marine Air Command and Control. The MACG operates secondary reparable floats for Maine Air Command and Control System (MACCS) peculiar ground electronics equipment.

(6) Additional Supply Support. The Navy provides supply support for aircraft and Aviation Support Equipment (ASE) in the ACE. The squadron requests replacement aircraft and depot-level repair of aircraft. A small cadre of aviation ordnance technicians assist in the throughput of class V(A) to outlying satellite ACE Ammunition Supply Points (ASP's). (Satellite ASP's are generally established for both air and ground units). **Refer to FM 100-15 Corps Operations, chapter 5.**



Figure 5-8. Ground Supply When Deployed.

9. CSS OPERATIONS CENTER (CSSOC).

a. General. The CSSOC is the agency within the structure of the CSSE and subordinate CSS units, which controls and coordinates the day-to-day operations of the CSS organization. The CSSOC is established in the command post of the CSSE and is operated by the G-3/S-3. For aviation-peculiar CSS, the ACE CSSOC is operated by the G-4/S-4.

b. Purpose. The CSSOC supervises the execution of the CSSE Commanders decisions by continuously monitoring and recording the status of CSS operations. This continuous monitoring and recording is accomplished by G-3/4 and S-3/4 watch officers/chiefs and detachment Liaison

Officers (LNO's). MAGTF operations are monitored within the CSSOC via communication / information nets, requests for CSS support, the continuous updates to personnel / equipment status boards and the update of map boards.

c. Responsibilities. The following are the normal CSSOC responsibilities: **Refer to MCWP 4-11 pages 2-18 and 3-8 for responsibilities.**

(1) Focuses on meeting the needs of the supported units.

(2) Continually monitors and records the status of CSS operations.

(3) Supervises the execution of the CSSE commander's decisions.

(4) Operates 24 hours per day during combat operations.

(5) Controls the CSS request net(s), CSSA local net(s), hot lines, and teletype/data links.

d. Functions. The following are the normal CSSOC functions: **Refer to MCWP 4-11 page 3-9 and discuss the functions of a CSSOC.**

(1) Receiving and recording operational reports from subordinate units.

(2) Maintain current plots of friendly and enemy situations/locations.

(3) Preparing and submitting operational reports to higher headquarters.

(4) Providing dedicated communications channels for control of CSS operations.

(5) Transmitting orders and decisions.

(6) Monitoring the progress of CSS operations and reporting significant events and incidents to the Commander.

(7) Advising interested staff sections of events or information of immediate concern to them.

(8) Serving as the principal point of contact for liaison personnel from senior, supported or adjacent units.

(9) Maintaining a CSS Rear Area Security (RAS) overlay.

(10) Coordinating RAS for CSS installations within the rear area.

e. Arrangements. The commander may choose either a centralized or decentralized CSSOC. Centralized control and decentralized execution are ideals sought in logistics support operations

where a balance between centralization and decentralization is difficult to achieve. An optimal mixture of centralized control and decentralized execution will be based on the circumstances. **Refer to MCWP 4-11 page 3-9 for arrangements of a CSSOC.**

(1) Centralized. This places functional representatives with the CSSOC. The advantage is that the commander and watch officer has immediate access to technical advice. The disadvantage can be the high level of activity within a confined space.

(2) Decentralized. Decentralization arrangement is the dispersion or distribution of functions and powers from a central authority to subordinate units or organizations. This arrangement places functional representatives outside the immediate span of control of the CSSOC/Watch Officer. Small organizations and those further forward most often select this arrangement due to the requirement for dispersion and distribution of CSS assets to supported units.

f. The ACE may establish an Aviation Ground Support Operations Center (AGSOC) to control aviation ground support task at the ACE airfields(s).

g. Rapid Request.

(1) Format. The primary form used to request all CSS from the CSSOC is the rapid request. The format for the rapid request is normally specified in the CSSE's local SOP and should be made available to all supported units. To save time, the CSSOC can direct that an abbreviated line format be completed for the specific CSS being requested (only applicable lines or paragraphs be completed). Brevity codes may also be used to save time in processing requests. The abbreviated line format and brevity codes make transmission of the rapid request via the radio much easier and faster. It is imperative that all required information (as specified by the CSSE SOP) be provided on the rapid request in order to move effectively provide the requested CSS.

(2) Routing. All rapid requests, both internal and external to the CSSE, will be submitted to the CSSE Operations Officer. Upon receipt, the rapid request will be assigned a sequence number and logged into an established tracking system. The rapid request will then be forwarded to the CSSE detachment that provides that CSS function.

(3) Files. The CSSOC will maintain the following rapid request files:

(a) Pending Rapid Request File. Contains all requests that have not been completed.

(b) Completed Rapid Request File. Contains all completed requests. A rapid request is completed when the requested CSS has been provided and the action CSS detachment has notified the CSSOC.

(c) Canceled Rapid Request File. Contains all requests that have been canceled either by the requester or the CSSE Operations Officer.

h. The following is a flow chart for CSSE Operations. **Refer to MCWP 4-11 page 5-4 and discuss CSSE Operations.**



10. TACTICAL LOGISTICAL GROUP (TACLOG).

a. General. The TACLOG is a temporary task organization formed by the MAGTF Landing Force. Subordinate commanders may also establish TACLOGs; however, we will be focusing on the MAGTF/LF TACLOG. **Refer to MCWP 4-11 page 2-21 for TACLOG.**

b. Authority. The MAGTF TACLOG is the senior LF TACLOG. It exercises only coordinating authority over subordinate TACLOG's. It does not possess operational control. However, the senior MAGTF TACLOG will normally exercise administrative control over logistic supplies and services and limited operational control on logistic specific units. Normally a logistician runs the TACLOG and must be involved early on in the planning.

c. Mission. The TACLOG mission is to advise the Navy Control Organization (PHIBRON CIC) of Landing Force (LF) tactical requirements during ship-to-shore movement. It is simply

the landing forces liaison to the Navy Control Organization. It also functions as the liaison element with the unit's operations center Landing Force Operations Center (LFOC), or LF COC on ship.

d. Command Relationships.

(1) Per the wire diagram, the Commander, Landing Force (CLF) is subordinate to the Commander, Amphibious Task Force (CATF). In this case the MEU Commander is the CLF and the Amphibious Commander (PHIBRON) is the CATF. The CLF (MEU) and the CATF (PHIBRON) comprise the landing force component as part of the Carrier Battle Group (CVBG). In other words, the MEU (Marine Corps) and PHIBRON (Navy) are the Naval Expeditionary components to the COCOM / JTF. This three-ship composition, with the PHIBRON staff and the embarked Marines is commonly referred to as the Amphibious Readiness Group (ARG).

(2) Within the upper diagram is the CATF (PHIBRON) in detail. From the wire diagram you can see that both the PHIBRON and the Landing Force or CLF make up the CATF. The CLF has the standard organization of a MAGTF. This MAGTF has a Command Element (CE), a Ground Combat Element (GCE), an Aviation Combat Element (ACE), and a Combat Service Support Element (CSSE).

(3) The smallest of our standard MAGTF's is the MEU.

(a) The Command Element (CE) is comprised of a permanent organization (CO/XO, S-Shops) plus the depicted task organized attachments.

(b) The Ground Combat Elements (GCE) base permanent organization is the Infantry Battalion. The Infantry Battalion becomes a Battalion Landing Team (BLT) with the depicted task organized platoon reinforcements.

(c) The Aviation Combat Element (ACE) is a composite aviation squadron built around a permanent organized CH-46 squadron. The depicted task organized reinforcements to this squadron form the ACE.

(d) The Combat Service Support Element (CSSE) for the MEU is the MEU Service Support Group (MSSG). The MSSG draws task-organized detachments from their respective permanent parent battalions within the FSSG.

(4) In a MEU level deployment, the MEU normally deploys within a three ship Amphibious Squadron (PHIBRON), also known as the Amphibious Readiness Group (ARG). The given three ships mix of an LHA, LPD and a LSD spreadload the combat power of the MEU across each of the ships within the ARG.

(a) The LHA (Death Star) is generally the command center for the PHIBRON (CATF) and the MEU (CLF). The PHIBRON Commander and his staff, and the MEU Commander and his staff are located aboard this ship. The BLT Commander and the ACE Commander are also normally located on this ship. Only the MSSG Commander is not located

on this ship, and located on the LPD (historically the predominance of supplies are located on this ship).

(b) Due to the spreadload of the MEU's, therefore the PHIBRON's combat power logistic agencies are required to coordinate initial embarkation, phasing ashore and retrograde operations for the MEU (CLF). Coordination is also required between the MEU elements (CE, BLT, ACE and MSSG) with each individual ship of the PHIBRON (CATF).

(c) Therefore, for each ship of the PHIBRON, MEU Embarkation Officers (Team Embarkation Officers-TEO's) coordinate embarkation / debarkation efforts with each ships Embarkation Officer (Combat Cargo Officer). During exercises and operations, each ship stands up their individual TACLOG's to coordinate these efforts, with the MEU CE's TACLOG on the LHA (Big Deck) as the senior TACLOG.

(5) The organization of the TACLOG varies to meet requirements for specific units and operations. The unit making the assault establishes and provides representatives (e.g., Operations, Embark and Logistics) to the TACLOG. TACLOG's vary in composition based on the level of command and the number of landing units. Refer to MCWP 4-11 pages 2-21, 2-22 and 5-2 for TACLOG Organizations.

(6) This planning starts at the top with the PHIBRON (CATF) and the MEU (CLF), and runs parallel and congruently through their respective staffs. It starts with the Commanders, and then all the way down to the Team Embarkation Officer (TEO's). The MEU (CLF) then takes the PHIBRON's (CATF) guidance to initiate the order. The TACLOG is the MEU's logistic organization to deploy the Commander's combat power from each ship to shore. (The TACLOG is both a temporary logistics organization geared for amphibious operations, but it is also a space aboard ship).

(7) This slide provides a MEU CE level TACLOG aboard an LHA (other command ships may be configured differently). The MEU S-4, Embarkation Officer, Watch Officer/personnel, Major Subordinate Element (MSE: BLT, ACE and MSSG) LNO's operate within the TACLOG. The MEU TACLOG works directly with the PHIBRON's Combat Information Center (CIC) personnel to employ the landing plans, coordinate aviation transportation and re-embark the Landing Force (LF). As required, they monitor the CSS request nets to work through emergency support issues. The TACLOG also updates the MEU's COC on ship called the Landing Force Operations Center (LFOC).

(8) Per the landing plan, the LFOC is provided details of waves and serial landings. This additional information keeps both operators and logisticians within the MEU and the PHIBRON appraised of the combat power ashore and the amount remaining aboard ship.

(9) Each MSE of the MEU will standup their own TACLOG to coordinate logistic functions for their respective commands. These MSE TACLOG's will provide similar coordination with the MSE's COC, and will be the primary point of contact for logistic matters to the MEU TACLOG.

e. Draw. During an amphibious operation, the PHIBRON (CATF) and the MEU (CLF) will establish the Amphibious Objective Area (AOA). Within this AOA, one of four amphibious actions will take place (common acronym for the four types of amphibious operations is DRAW):

(1) Demonstration

(2) Raid

(3) Assault

(4) Withdrawal

f. Amphibious missions/tasks. During this Amphibious Operation, one of the following missions/tasks will be placed on this force:

(1) Establish a landing force on a hostile shore by "Forcible Entry"

(2) Prosecute further combat operations

(3) Seize site for advance naval/air base

(4) Deny use of area to the enemy

g. Objectives. Once the AOA is established, the PHIBRON (CATF) will establish the Amphibious Task Force (ATF) Objective. The MEU (CLF) will then establish "enabling" Landing Force (LF) Objectives that support subsequent operations to satisfy the missions surrounding the CATF's ATF Objective.

h. Responsibilities. The following are the collective responsibilities of the TACLOG, Navy control organizations and LFSP: **Refer to MCWP 4-11 page 2-22 for a list of TACLOG responsibilities.**

(1) Know the status of the progress of the landing and all support requests.

(2) Orchestrate and regulate the movement of scheduled waves, to the correct location, at the correct time.

(3) Ensure that Floating Dumps and Prepositioned Emergency Supplies are responsive to the needs of the LF.

(4) Ensure that on call waves are prepared to move ashore.

(5) Orchestrate preparations for nonscheduled waves to move ashore.

i. TACLOG Diagram. The following is a flow chart for the TACLOG. **efer to MCWP 4-11 page 5-3 for TACLOG diagram.**



11. PLANNING FOR SUPPLY OPERATIONS.

a. General. Supply requires the longest forward planning because it has the broadest scope of support within CSS. As a result within the tactical plan, supply support becomes one of the first planning considerations. Regardless of the phase of the operation a unit commander can receive responsive supply support if both the supported and supporting units know each other's responsibilities.

b. Supported Unit Responsibilities. The supported unit commander through G-3 and G-4 (S-3 and S-4) initiates detailed planning for CSS. Planning begins with determining support requirements, assigning priorities, and allocating resources.

(1) Determining Support Requirements. The supported unit commander determines and identifies the supply support requirements beyond his/her organic capabilities. When determining Supply Support, the Commander uses the same process as with determining CSS, Fire Support, or Air Support. This process is Mission, Enemy, Terrain, Troops and Equipment

and Time, Space and Logistics (METT-TS-L). Considerations that assist the commander in determining support requirements are:

(a) Mission.

1 Concept of Operation (e.g., main effort, supporting effort, reserve, priority of fires).

2 Task Organization (e.g., Infantry or Heavy Mechanized, CSSD (direct support).

(b) Characteristics of the objective. (e.g., Infantry or Heavy Mechanized)

(c) Enemy capabilities

(d) Characteristics of Operations (i.e., course of action)

(e) Time of the Operation. (i.e., night or day)

(f) Transportation System (both outside and inside objective)

(g) Task requiring special supplies and equipment

(h) Budget Data Sheets (BDS) are excellent tools for unit supply personnel to capture support requirements and their associated funding requirements.

(i) Within this requirements determination process, unit commanders must access their unit capabilities. This net shortfall between requirements and capabilities are the shortfalls that would be passed to the CSSE for sourcing. The following formula applies:

a. Unit Requirements - Unit Capabilities equal Shortfalls

(2) Assigning Priorities. The supported unit commander establishes and assigns priorities associated with the concept of operation and scheme of maneuver. The assignment of priorities, in turn, will affect the plans of the supporting CSS element's concept of CSS.

(3) Allocating Resources. Like assignment of priorities, the supported unit commander's allocation of CSS resources affects the supporting CSS elements concept of CSS. This allocation includes those assets, which the commander desires to retain as a reserve.

c. Supporting Unit Responsibilities. Once the supported units requirements are known, the units are advised and assisted in procuring of resources and distribution of assets to support the mission and concept of operations.

(1) Determination of Requirements. This step must address each CSS functional support area. These requirements are based on the supported commander's concept of operation and the situational factors. CSS Commanders must extract / identify specified and implied requirements /

tasks to ensure responsive support. The CSS Commander also uses the METT-T process when determining requirements to support the other units as well as himself/herself. The CSS element must know requirements early in the planning phase and be informed as changes occur in order to anticipate future requirements.

(2) Procurement of Assets. The CSS element procures assets based on the determination of the requirements to sustain the supported unit. The CSS element attempts to prevent "over supply" by processing procurement actions with realistic quantities.

(3) Distribution of Assets. At this stage, the CSSE provides the required supplies and services. This stage has the most critical impact on responsiveness, flexibility and economy of CSS. Additionally, this stage will be the most challenging for CSSE supply personnel to ensure accountability across the spectrum.

(4) Within this requirements determination process, CSS Commanders must incorporate each supported customers requirements (their net shortfalls), while access their own requirements and capabilities. This net shortfall between requirements and capabilities will then become the CSSE, therefore the MAGTF's shortfalls that the MAGTF must arbitrate:

(a) Source the shortfall outside of the MAGTF.

(b) Change the mission.

(c) Prioritize the MAGTF's resources, which will establish the CSS Rules of Engagement (ROE) between the supported and supporting agencies within the MAGTF.

(d) The following formula applies:

(Customer Net Shortfalls) X (# of Customers)] + (CSSE Requirements) – (Unit Capabilities) equals CSSE Shortfalls or MAGTF Shortfalls

12. SUSTAINMENT.

a. Purpose. The purpose of sustainment planning is to ensure the commander has the material necessary to accomplish the assigned mission. Sustainment requirements should be accurate and understood by both the supported and supporting unit. Information to help in the planning can be found in operation orders (Letter's of Instructions) passed down from higher headquarters.

b. MAGTF Commander. The MAGTF Commander must determine: the force to be supported, Operation Tempo (Op Tempo) that includes duration for which that support is required, the combat environment, alternate sources of support and other planning guidance (e.g., safety levels, external support available and support responsibilities). With this information the commander and staff can compute, by class and Subclass of Supply, the sustainment required.

c. Methodology. The Marine Corps uses Days of Supply (DOS) and Days of Ammunition (DOA) as measures of effectiveness for sustainability. DOS & DOA are quantities of supplies expressed in days. **Refer to MCWP 4-11 pages 2-3, 2-4 and 2-17 and MCWP 4-11 pages 2-13 and 2-14 for Days of Supply and Ammunition.**

(1) The FSSG holds 60 DOS / DOA in support of the MEF*.

(2) The BSSG holds 30 DOS / DOA in support of the MEB*.

(3) The MSSG holds 15 DOS / DOA in support of the MEU*.

(4) The CSSD hold mission specific DOS / DOA in support of the MAGTF and is METT-TS-L dependent.

*** Actual DOS / DOA may vary for each class of supply**.

(5) Calculating DOS is a simple process. If we need to determine the quantity of MRE's that we need to have available for a particular operation, the CSSE will need to know some basic information.

(a) The length of the operation.

(b) The number of Marines that require support.

(c) The Feed Plan.

(d) The following example is provided:

(1) Support Required: 100 Marines in the field for 9 days of training.

(2) Feed Plan: 3 MRE's / day

(3) Daily Requirement = (100 Marines) X (3 MRE's) = 300 MRE / day = 1DOS

(4) Training Requirement = (300 MRE / day) X (9 Days) = 2,700 MRE's

a If O/H = 2,700 MRE's = 9 DOS
b If O/H = 3,300 MRE's = 11 DOS
c If O/H = 2,100 MRE's = 7 DOS

d. Objective. The Marine Corps objective is to position the full level of sustainment with the active forces for use with the different types of MAGTF's. The MAGTF's equipment and operating stocks will form the initial stocks in combat.

e. **Calculating requirements**. Sustainment requirements are calculated using MAGTF II, the War Reserve System (WRS) and limited modeling techniques.

(1) MAGTF II. The MARFOR/MAGTF uses this system to generate a force equipment list and uses the data in the WRS to develop tailored numbered War Reserve withdrawal plans, which support a specific mission.

(2) WRS. This is the primary means by which Marine Corps Logistics Base, Albany, GA sources sustainment. This system addresses classes I, II, III, IV, VI and IX, but excludes all Aviation items.

13. WAR RESERVE.

a. General. One of the main purposes for our war reserve stocks is to "buy" time until the commercial infrastructure can "re-tool" to produce combat and sustainment equipment and supplies. If all goes as planned, the commercial infrastructure will begin production within 30 days and meet DOD requirements within 60 days. Contingency contracts are designed to bridge some of these gaps and to account for surge requirements.

(1) The above graph depicts as the days wear on during an operation, our stocks will decrease in kind over this space of time. At some point, the civilian (industrial) sector will re-tool, and begin producing combat / sustainment equipment and supplies at an increasing rate. This time lag for the civilian sector is the level of "risk" that the military and the country must be arbitrated. Based on Operational Plans (OPlans), as a country, we do not enough funding (or willing to expend) to support our military at 100% for personnel, equipment and supplies.

b. MAGTF Building Blocks. The Marine Corps applies its forces in combat with a building block methodology. For any given crisis around the world, a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) or a SPMAGTF is likely to be one of the first forces to be on station.

c. Endurance. A MEU will deploy and be prepared to employ its organic combat forces, with 15 DOS at the Ready Reserve. If the situation dictates, an additional MEU could be attached to the first MEU. Eventually as additional Marine combat forces arrive, the summation of the MEU's could then form a MEB (30 DOS). This same building block sequence of events could then be translated to form one or more MEF's. As our combat power multiplies, so does the DOS. In effect, as we build forces in theater, the Marine Corps is transitioning combat power from CONUS to OCONUS, and increasing endurance throughout the deployments.

d. Marine Corps War Reserve Program. WRM is defined as mission-essential principal end items, secondary items, and munitions required to attain operational objectives in the scenarios authorized for sustainability planning and other stockage objectives approved for programming in the Defense Planning Guidance. This requirement is based on Class VII Principal End Items (PEI's), Mission-Essential Class IV Construction and Fortification Material, Class V Ammunition, and OPLAN specific guidance received from the supported Combatant Commander (COCOM). The Marine Corps attempts to satisfy the WRM requirement by first using peacetime operating stocks possessed by the Marine Corps or the DOD. To satisfy remaining requirements, the Marine Corps relies on the U.S. industrial base and host nation support. The MC War Reserve Program is broken down into many sub-elements. The following

sub-elements are provided: **Refer to MCWP 4-1 pages 2-15 through 2-20, MCWP 4-11 pages 4-2, 5-16 through 5-18, MCWP 4-11.7/4-6 pages 2-1 through 2-5, 8-4, 8-5 and MCWP 4-12 Chapter 2 for War Reserve.**

(1) Peacetime Operating Stocks (POS). POS are everyday Marine Corps operating supplies. Unit T/E's and Type III (CTEP) items make up this element of the war reserve.

(2) Training Stocks. These stocks are those secondary consumable items (normally classes I, II, V (W) and IX) that are procured to support the programmed annual training requirements. These stocks are held at the unit level or intermediate level supply support and base.

(3) Core War Reserves (CWR). CWR makes up both the accompanying equipment / supplies and the resupply for MAGTF's, or are located in or nearby the theater of operations, stocks held on Maritime Prepositioned Ships (MPS), and those stocks held as Landing Force Operational Reserve Material (LFORM). Thus, CWR provides the fundamental sustainment capability to the MAGTF. This category of supplies may be held in stores, aboard Maritime Prepositioned Ships (MPS), or with Integrated Materiel Management (IMM) Activities. For purposes of control, CWR is further divided into the categories of starter and swing stocks.

(a) Starter stocks (force held) are war reserve materiel stocks prepositioned in or near a theater of operations to last until resupply at wartime rates is established. These supplies are normally held by the forces aboard prepositioned ships.

(b) Swing stocks (stores held) are War Reserve Materiel stocks prepositioned ashore or afloat for meeting war reserve requirements of more than one contingency and in more than one theater of operations. Stocks held at Albany (MPB) are included within these stocks.

(4) Contingency Retention War Reserves (CRWR)**.** CRWR are supplies and equipment already in the military inventory that exceeds the core war reserve materiel requirement. They represent a stock retention objective only and typically contain items not currently being manufactured or ones that would be procured from a dedicated foreign source. CRWR are used for force re-constitution, expansion, or war reserve support to allies. These stocks are prepositioned in the event a war plan or some portion of this plan is executed. Stock held in Norway, Norway Airlanded MEB stocks (NALMEB) is an example of a MEB's worth of contingency stocks held in storage (caves) as a result of the Cold War. Additionally, the Aviation Logistics Support Ship (TAVB) is a program developed to transport critical, tailored, Intermediate-Level Maintenance and Supply Support to a forward operating area in support of deployed aircraft. There are two TAVB's (one located on the west coast and one on the east coast).

(a) Reconstitution - As stockage objectives are met in CWR, assets may become excess. Before these stocks are disposed of, a determination will be made if they are viable for storage in support of the planned reconstitution force. The Marine Corps may focus more on reconstituting individual units, vice a whole force, which would augment or reinforce the capabilities of existing MAGTF's.

(b) Norway, Airlanded MEB stocks (NALMEB). Previous agreements between the United States and Norway, have established prepositioned stocks (NALMEB) which are part of the CRWR. These stocks are used for regional contingencies and are maintained at the same level as Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) assets in the CWR, to include necessary modernization.

(c) War Reserve Stocks for Allies (WRS-A). WRS-A is a DOD program that the Marine Corps supports for specific Allied countries using USMC-owned stocks. Its primary focus is to provide for an initial sustainment capability for the Allied country where the stocks are stored. These stocks can be, but are not normally, used for MAGTF support.

(5) Reparable Issue Point (RIP). Both the Main RIP's and the Using Unit RIP's (also known as sub-floats) are considered as Peacetime Operating Stocks, and as a major portion of the Marine Corps War Reserve Program.

(6) Risk. The net shortfall of all of these stocks is again the risk that we endure between wars!

(7) The war reserve material arrives in a 30 day block. It is scheduled to arrive around the time that any "forces held sustainment" and MPF sustainment is being depleted. After those 60 days is depleted, we rely on the Theater Support Command (U.S. Army) to provide us common item supply support.

(8) An additional source of reserve material comes about by default. The following equipment applies:

e. Remain Behind Equipment (RBE). RBE is any organic FMF equipment, regardless of class of supply that remains behind when a force deploys to marry up with prepositioned equipment. Force Commanders are responsible for the identification, accountability, control and reporting of RBE. Accordingly, they will publish a Standing Operating Procedures for handling RBE. The Force Commander and Commander, Marine Corps Logistics Bases use RBE to fill local and/or supply system shortages for Active and Reserve Units, and to reduce transportation requirements.

f. Leave Behind Equipment (LBE). Because the Marine Corps task organizes for specific missions, we often do not need all equipment listed on the respective T/E. Therefore, LBE is equipment that is not required to support the operation. However, this equipment must be properly stored and ready for issue in the event the deployed MAGTF requires this equipment on short notice.

g. Landing Force Operational Reserve Material (LFORM). An additional ready reserve for MAGTF's, particularly MEU's, is the Landing Force Operational Reserve Material (LFORM). The following parameters constitute an LFORM stock:

(1) 15 DOS / DOA for Class I, III, IV and V (A and W)

(2) Embarked by Navy onto amphibious ships

(3) Stored in pre-packaged containers

(4) Spread loaded to LFORM compatible ships

(5) Used only during contingency or extreme emergencies

(6) The use of LFORM requires MarFor level approval

(7) LFORM stocks have separate reporting procedures

(8) Any use of LFORM will require coordination with Navy

(9) The MAGTF / ARG should plan to replenish LFORM at 10 DOS / DOA, and/or the established Safety Level (S/L)

SUMMARY:
Over the past few hours we have covered:

1. Principles of CSS
2. Functional areas of CSS
3. CSS Organizations
4. CSS Mission Objectives
5. CSS Planning Documents
6. CSS Mission Statement
7. CSS Installations & Organizations
8. CSS Operations Center
9. Tactical Logistical Group
10. Planning for Supply Operations
11. Sustainment
12. War Reserve

REFERENCES:

MCWP 4-1
MCWP 4-11
MCWP 4-11.7 / 4-6
MCWP 4-12
MCRP 4-11.8
MCRP4-11.8A
MCRP 5-2a / 5-12a
FMFM 4-1
FM 101-5
MCO P4400.39G